Date when decision was rendered: 4.6.1997

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 2061; R96/1572

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

respect for private life, communication, respect for correspondence, freedom of expression, limitations of rights and freedoms,
respekt för privatliv, kommunikation, respekt för korrespondens, yttrandefrihet, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, viestintä, kirjeenvaihdon kunnioittaminen, ilmaisuvapaus, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 8 of the Constitution Act; sections 27 and 28 of the Criminal Investigations Act

= regeringsformen 8 §; förundersökningslagen 27 § och 28 §

= hallitusmuoto 8 §; esitutkintalaki 27 § ja 28 §.

ECHR-8, ECHR-10

Abstract

The police was investigating an alleged copyright offence in which an unidentified person had sent e-mail messages infringing copyrights to Internet newsgroups through an anonymous server run by a Finnish company.A, the managing director and owner of the company, was heard as a witness during the pretrial investigation of the case.The police demanded that A hand over to the police the sender's e-mail address which had been recorded in the anonymous server's database.A referred to the confidentiality of the message and refused.On the application of the police, the court of first instance made a decision obligating A to reveal the e-mail address.A appealed against the decision to the Helsinki Court of Appeal referring to section 8 of the Constitution Act and to the protection of the confidentiality of a message.The court of appeal noted that the protection of the confidentiality of a message, as prescribed in section 8 of the Constitution Act, covers not only the contents of the message but also other information which is relevant with regard to the confidentiality of the message, such as the name and address of the sender or the receiver.However, in this case the messages were sent to newsgroups in a public Internet network and were thus public.The fact that the messages were sent through an anonymous server was not relevant.The court of appeal concluded that A could not refuse to reveal the e-mail address on the basis of section 8 of the Constitution Act and that there were no other legal grounds for such refusal either.The court further referred to Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR and noted that the rights protected by these articles may be subject to restrictions which are prescribed by law and necessary, for example, for the purposes of crime investigation.A was obligated to reveal the requested information.The Supreme Court refused A leave to appeal.

1.4.1998 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 5.12.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3010; R2002/664

Reference to source

KKO 2003:119.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2003 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2003 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2003 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 734-748

Subject

respect for private life, respect for correspondence, lawyers, limitations of rights and freedoms,
respekt för privatliv, respekt för korrespondens, jurister, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, kirjeenvaihdon kunnioittaminen, lakimiehet, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 4, section 2-2 of the Coercive Measures Act; Chapter 17, section 23-1-4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 10 of the Constitution Act

= tvångsmedelslagen 4 kapitel 2 § 2 mom.; rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 23 § 1 mom. 4 punkten; grundlagen 10 §

= pakkokeinolaki 4 luku 2 § 2 mom.; oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 23 § 1 mom. 4 kohta; perustuslaki 10 §.

ECHR-6; ECHR-8

Abstract

A was suspected of an economic offence.In the pretrial investigation some documents had been confiscated from A, among them correspondence between A and his lawyer in Spain.The correspondence dealt with financial transactions, but it had not been claimed that it would have had anything to do with the case against A.The issue here was whether the documents could be confiscated.According to Chapter 17, section 23-1-4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, counsel shall not testify in respect of what the client has entrusted to him/her for the pursuit of the case, unless the client consents to such testimony.In addition, the Coercive Measures Act prescribes that a document may not be confiscated or used as evidence, if it contains information covered by the prohibition in the above section of the Code of Judicial Procedure.The Supreme Court noted that section 23-1-4 was open to various interpretations.Having reviewed a number of other relevant provisions in national law, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and the ECHR, the Court chose a literal interpretation of the provision.The prohibition was to be interpreted restrictively to the effect that it only referred to the actions of counsel in a court or administrative procedure which was pending or to be initiated.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, A referred to Article 8 of the ECHR and the cases of Campbell v. the United Kingdom (Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 233) and Niemietz v.Germany (Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A.No. 251).The Supreme Court noted that A's case dealt with slightly different issues than the cases A was referring to.The Court then discussed Article 8-2 of the ECHR and the possibility of limitations of the right to private live, provided that such limitations were in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.The Court pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the protection of confidentiality between counsel and client especially in connection with the right to a fair trial.Taking this into account, it could be concluded from the limitations clause in Article 8-2 that a state may authorize by means of national legislation an interference in the correspondence between counsel and client, if the confiscated documents have no connection with a trial which is pending or to be initiated soon.Hence, in the Court's view the ECHR did not require an expansive interpretation of section 23-1-4.The Court reached the same conclusion when discussing the protection of private life in section 10 of the Constitution Act.The Supreme Court held that the documents referred to in A's case could be confiscated and used as evidence.

Two justices of the Supreme Court took a different view.As section 23-1-4 was open to various interpretations, the court should choose an interpretation which favours the protection of fundamental rights.The justices referred to Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR and to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Niemietz (see above), Botka and Paya v.Austria (decision of 29 March 1993, inadmissible), B.R. v.Germany (decision of 23 October 1997, inadmissible) and Tamosius v. the United Kingdom (decision of 19 September 2002, inadmissible).They found that the European Court of Human Rights had paid special attention to the facts whether the confiscation order was specified and limited and whether national legislation contained provisions on procedure by which it could be secured that confidential information between counsel and client was not disclosed without a reasonable cause.In the justices' view these requirements were not met in A's case.They concluded that the documents should not have been confiscated.

See also the case of Sorvisto v.Finland (Application no. 19348/04), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 January 2009.

21.4.2004 / 14.1.2009 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 18.5.2006

Judicial body: Riihimäki Court of First Instance = Riihimäki tingsrätt = Riihimäen käräjäoikeus

Reference: Report no. 06/350; R06/84

Reference to source

Registry of the Riihimäki Court of First Instance

Riihimäki tingsrätts registratorskontor

Riihimäen käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

respect for correspondence, freedom of expression, prisoners,
respekt för korrespondens, yttrandefrihet, fångar,
kirjeenvaihdon kunnioittaminen, ilmaisuvapaus, vangit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 2, section 9-1 of the Act on the enforcement of penal sanctions; section 47-2 of the Prison Administration Decree; sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution Act

= lag om verkställighet av straff 2 kapitel 9 § 1 mom.; fångvårdsförordning 47 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 10 § och 12 §

= laki rangaistusten täytäntöönpanosta 2 luku 9 § 1 mom.; vankeinhoitoasetus 47 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 10 § ja 12 §.

ECHR-8; ECHR-10

Abstract

Prison governor B had stopped three letters sent by prisoner X, on the ground that X had misused his right of correspondence.In B's view it was not appropriate to send the letters further, because while the letters were directed to various authorities supervising prisons, the envelopes were in fact addressed to the media.In addition, B held that X had no right to sign and send the letters on behalf of all the prisoners, because the prisoners had not officially formed a prisoners' union with rules and elected president.The letters had later disappeared and could not be presented as evidence in court.The court of first instance found that X had a right to sign and send the letters.Although the prisoners had not formed a union, X had been elected the prisoners' representative in a meeting in which the prison governor had also been present.The court then agreed that, according to law, a prison governor may stop a prisoner's letters if there is reason to suspect that the right of correspondence has been misused.However, the wording of the provision is loose and open to interpretation.Because both inviolability of correspondence and freedom of expression are protected by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution Act, the court held that the provisions concerning misuse of correspondence must be given a narrow interpretation and letters can be stopped only as an exceptional measure.As grounds for its decision the court referred to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Silver and Others (judgment of 25 March 1983, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 61) and McCallum (judgment of 30 August 1990, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 183).The court concluded that in this case the right of correspondence had not been misused and the governor had no right to stop the letters.The governor was issued a caution.The decision is final.

10.4.2007 / 10.4.2007 / RHANSKI